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CHAPTER 1- INTRODUCTION TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
1.1 Introduction  
The idea of sustainable development is not a new one; there has always been 
the fear that the over-exploitation of natural resources and its impact on the 
environment would result in the inability of present and future generations to 
maintain the environmental conditions under which they live.1 The international 
community has been increasingly forced to recognise that the current condition of the 
environment is a global concern.2 Developing alongside this recognition is an 
awareness of the relationship between economic growth/ trade liberalisation and the 
environment.3 While economic development and environmental conservation were 
initially seen as conflicting ideas, the concept of sustainable development emerged 
with the idea of compromise by seeing the two as interdependent and mutually 
reinforcing.4 
The debate on trade and the environment necessarily involves international 
trade organisations and how their policies affect the environment. To this end a large 
part of the trade and environment debate has involved the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) and its approach to trade measures that relate to environmental protection. A 
large part of this debate has been focused on whether its treatment of non-product 
related Process and Production Methods are in line with the goal of sustainable 
development. 
What follows is a brief introduction on sustainable development and trade.   
 
1.2 Sustainable development 
Sustainable development is based on the understanding that 
underdevelopment in combination with poverty may have the effect of causing the 
                                                          
1 Jacobus A. Du Pisani, ‘Sustainable development- historical roots of the concept’, Environmental 
Sciences, Vol. 3, No 2 (2006) 83-96 at 83.  
2 Dominic A Gentile, ‘International Trade and the Environment: What is the Role of the WTO?’, 
Fordham Environmental Law Review, Vol. 19 No 1 (2009) 195- 230.   
3 Ibid.   
4 World Commission on Environment and Development, ‘Our Common Future’, Oxford University 
Press (1987); Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment U.N. Doc. 
A/Conf. 48/14/ Rev. 1 (1973) and Rio Declaration on Environment and Development U.N. Doc. 
A.CONF. 151/26 (1992).  
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deterioration of the environment which in turn poses a threat to development itself.5 
Conversely there is also the understanding that economic growth can lead to the 
creation of patterns that diminish natural resources, limiting the availability of 
natural wealth and resources and the capacity of humans to sustain themselves.6 
Based on these understandings, the core concept of sustainable development is an 
approach to development that balances different and competing needs against the 
environmental, social and economic limitations faced by society. The principle of 
sustainable development promotes the idea of living within our environmental means. 
The popularisation of modern sustainable development is the result of the 
Brundtland Commission’s report ‘Our Common Future’ published in 1987.7 The 
group was commissioned by the UN to develop long-term environmental strategies 
for the international community and its resulting report is seen as a watershed that 
enabled sustainable development to become a broad global policy objective.8 The 
report pointed to poverty as one of the causes of environmental degradation and 
argued for greater economic growth through increased trade so as to reverse this.9 It 
also argued for the integration of human development and environmental degradation 
and suggested that they had to be resolved simultaneously and in a mutually 
reinforcing way.10 The report discussed the need to apply integrated sustainable 
solutions to a broad range of problems and acknowledged the tension between 
economic growth and environmental protection. It concluded that economic growth 
was essential but that there should be a move towards sustainable development 
which would be environmentally sound. All these themes and tension were 
summarised into what has become the most popular and accepted definition of 
sustainable development; ‘development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’.11 This 
echoes other definitions in reflecting the need to integrate the goals of economic 
                                                          
5John C Dernbach, ‘Sustainable Development as a Framework for National Governance’, Case 
Western Reserve Law Review, Vol 49 No 1 (1998) 1- 103 at 25.  
6 Ibid.  
7 World Commission on Environment and Development, ‘Our Common Future’, Oxford University 
Press (1987).  
8 Ibid note 5.  
9Ibid note 7.   
10 Ibid note 7 at para 40.  
11 Ibid note 7 at para 27. 
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development with the protection of the environment in order to preserve the ability of 
future generations to maintain their well-being.12 
The core lesson of the Brundtland report was that sustainability has to be an 
integrated concept. That ‘solutions that address only environmental, only social or 
only economic concerns are radically insufficient. What is needed is a form of 
transdisciplinary thinking that focuses on the connections among the fields as much 
as on the contents of those fields’.13 It has become a resounding call for economic 
development and growth to be achieved in a manner consistent with the sound 
management of natural resources. It sees a balance between the two as the condition 
for the survival of both.14 
 
1.3 Source of sustainable development 
While the definition of sustainable development provided by the Brundtland 
report is the most widely recognised and is usually the starting point of discussions 
on sustainable development, there has been a build up to that point. This has been 
largely through the production of soft law, which adds more detail to the objectives 
of sustainable development. 
The most notable of these began with the Stockholm Declaration,15 which 
was the result of the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment. The 
Conference had the goal of providing guidelines for action to be taken by states and 
international organisations in relation to human interactions with the environment. 
To this end the conference produced a set of principles looking at the relationship 
between the environment and trade and how the environment may be preserved. 
Principle 2 of the Declaration laid down the idea of intergenerational equity in 
regards to natural resources, which is echoed by the Brundtland report, by providing 
that the natural resources must be safeguarded for the benefit of present and future 
                                                          
12 David Luff, ‘An overview of international law of sustainable development and a confrontation 
between WTO rules and sustainable development’, Belgian Review of International Law, Issue 1 
(1996) 90-144. 
13 John Robinson, ‘Squaring the circle? Some thoughts on the idea of sustainable development’, 
Ecological Economics, Vol. 48 (2004) 369-384 at 371.  
14 John C Dernbach, ‘Sustainable Development as a Framework for National Governance’, Case 
Western Reserve Law Review, Vol 49 No 1 (1998) 1- 103 at 25.   
15 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 
48/14/ Rev. 1 (1973). 
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generations through careful planning or management.16 Principle 8 set the general 
background for development and stated that ‘economic and social development is 
essential for ensuring a favourable living and working environment and for creating 
conditions on earth that are necessary for the improvement of the quality of life’.17 
Principle 13 of the Declaration was important as it endorsed the integrated approach 
which can be seen in the Brundtland report. It provided that in order to manage 
resources in a rational way so as to improve the environment, states ‘should adopt an 
integrated and coordinated approach to their development planning so as to ensure 
that development is compatible with the need to protect and improve environment for 
the benefit of their population’.18 
Taken together, all the principles of the Stockholm declaration emphasised 
the necessity of economic development to take place in conjunction with 
environmental protection. These principles were further developed and given shape 
by the Rio Declaration.19 The United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development, (the Rio Summit), focused on the vital role international trade plays in 
combatting poverty and promoting the concept of sustainable development. One of 
the outcomes of the Summit was the Rio Declaration, which effectively brought 
sustainable development into the legal sphere. Although the principles of the Rio 
Declaration are non-binding, they are formulated in strong legal terms so that they 
are ‘seen as the keystone of the conceptual articulation of sustainable development’20.  
The Rio Declaration also adopted the concept of development and 
environmental protection being mutually reinforcing by providing that, ‘in order to 
achieve sustainable development, environmental protection shall constitute an 
integral party of the development process and cannot be considered in isolation from 
it’.21 However, the Declaration is more explicit in providing the direction states 
should be moving towards by stating that in order ‘to achieve sustainable 
development and higher quality of life for all people, states should reduce and 
eliminate unsustainable patterns of production and consumption and promote 
                                                          
16 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 
48/14/ Rev. 1 (1973) at para 2. 
17 Ibid at para 8. 
18 Ibid note 16 at para 13. 
19 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development U.N. Doc. A.CONF. 151/26 (1992). 
20 Virginie Barral, ‘Sustainable Development in International Law: Nature and Operation of an 
Evolutive Legal Norm’, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 23. No 2 (2012) 377-400 at 378. 
21Ibid note 19 at para 4.  
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appropriate demographic policies’.22 The call for the elimination of unsustainable 
patterns of production and consumption has since become a constant theme in the 
discourse on sustainable development and will be discussed further in the dissertation.  
The Declaration continued to provide principles which have since become the 
core content of Sustainable development. These include the Precautionary 
principle,23 the Polluter Pays principle24  and the requirement to undertake 
Environmental Impact Assessments for activities that are likely to have adverse 
impacts on the environment.25 The importance of these principles is that when they 
are applied, they participate in the integration of economic development and 
environmental protection and thus promote the advancement of sustainable 
development. Part of this plan for integration can be seen in the fact that the 
Declaration provides that these environmental protection principles must not be used 
by states as an excuse to take protectionist measures to close their markets.  
The Rio Summit also produced Agenda 21 Plan of Implementation.26 The 
document prescribes policies, programmes and processes for international 
organisations and governments to follow when implementing the recommendations 
of the Rio Declaration.  
It is important to note that sustainable development is not devoid of meaning or 
normative value in international law. This is reflected in the Gabcikovo Dam case, 
decided in the International Court of Justice,27 which stated that  
…new norms and standards have been developed…such new norms have to be 
taken into consideration and such new standard given proper weight, not only 
when states contemplate new activities but also when continuing with activities 
begun in the past. This need to reconcile economic development with protection 
                                                          
22 Ibid note 19 at para 8. 
23 Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration provides that ‘in order to protect the environment, the 
Precautionary approach shall be widely applied by states according to their capabilities. Where there 
are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a 
reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation’.  
24 The Polluter Pays principles promotes the internalisation of environmental costs, taking the 
‘approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution with due regard to the public 
interest and without distorting international trade and investment’.  
25 Principle 17 of the Rio Declaration. 
26 Agenda 21, U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. AIConf. 151/26/Rev.1 
(Vol. 1), Annex 2 (1992) [hereinafter Agenda 21]. 
27 The International Court of Justice in the judicial arm of the United Nations, it provides advisory 
opinion on legal matters and settles disputes submitted to it by UN member states.  
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of the environment is aptly expressed in the concept of Sustainable 
development.28 
This understanding was expanded in the Iron Rhine case in which the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration balanced environmental protection against economic 
development and found that the enforcement of environmental measures by one state 
could not justify the denial of another state’s right to development.29 The reasoning 
of the court was that ‘environmental law and the law on development stand not as 
alternatives but as mutually reinforcing integral concepts which require that where 
development may cause significant harm to the environment, there is a duty to 
prevent, or at least mitigate such harm’.30 In the same case, the court linked 
sustainable development with the principle of integration and found that it required 
the ‘prevention and mitigation of environmental damage when undertaking an 
economic development project, suggesting that to ensure sustainable development, a 
state will have to prevent and mitigate damage to the environment’.31 The 
International Court of Justice also suggested in the Pulp Mills32 case that sustainable 
development implies the cooperation of the parties in the prevention of 
environmental damage.33 
These cases, just as the principles discussed above, echo the need for 
integration as a way of achieving sustainable development. The implication of the 
cases is that where trade liberalisation intersects with environmental norms, 
sustainable development may play a normative role in producing a balanced/ 
mutually supportive, integrated outcome.34  
 
1.4 Sustainable development and trade 
Environmentalists consider international trade as an accelerating factor, if not 
the proximate cause, of the over-exploitation of natural resource and ecological 
                                                          
28 Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia). Judgment. ICJ. Reports, (1997) at para 140. 
29Award in the Arbitration regarding the Iron Rhine Railway between the Kingdom of Belgium and 
the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 27 RIAA (2005) at para 59. 
30 Ibid.  
31Ibid note 20 at 187.  
32 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, Argentina v Uruguay, 2006 ICJ Rep 113.  
33Ibid note 20 at 187.  
34 Ibid note 20. 
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degradation.35 As stated above, one of the principle tenets of sustainable 
development is to balance the competing interests of trade and the environment, as 
such there is a push for economic development and growth to be achieved in a way 
that is consistent with the sustainable management of natural resources. To this end, 
there has been a focus on how the World Trade Organisation (WTO), an organisation 
with the principal mandate of facilitating the move towards an open and non-
discriminatory international trading system, interacts with the pursuit of sustainable 
development. The relationship between trade liberalisation and the environment 
means that it may sometimes be necessary for the WTO to delve into the realm of 
environmental issues. The interaction between trade and the environment is 
recognised in the preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement, which establishes the 
World Trade Organisation, when it provides that trade liberalisation should occur  
while allowing for the optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance with 
the objective of sustainable development seeking both to protect and preserve 
the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent 
with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic 
development.36 
This recognition creates the expectation that WTO Dispute Bodies, when 
interpreting the General Agreement of Trade and Tariffs (the document that details 
the general obligation of WTO member states), would respect state policies that seek 
to promote sustainable development. 
Preambular statements are not formally binding but they do play a role in the 
interpretation of a document, in particular when it comes to identifying the object 
and purpose of the legal document. The Doha Declaration reinforces sustainable 
development as an objective of the WTO.37 It confirms that sustainable development 
needs to be integrated into the mandate of the WTO, which is largely an economic 
organisation. It does so by reaffirming the WTO’s commitment to sustainable 
development. It states that the WTO is  
                                                          
35 Tanyarat Mungkalarungso, ‘The Trade and environment Debate’, Tulane Journal of International 
and Comparative Law, Vol. 10 (2002) 361- 385 at 361.  
36 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 
1144 (1994). 
37 Doha Declaration WT/MIN (01)/DEC/2. 
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‘convinced that the aims of upholding and safeguarding an open and 
non-discriminatory multilateral trading system, and acting for the 
protection of the environment and the promotion of sustainable 
development can and must be mutually supportive’.  
The Declaration as well as the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs also add that 
member states should not be prevented from adopting measures that protect the 
environment and animal or plant life, provided that such measures are not applied in 
ways that are ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the 
same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, and are 
otherwise in accordance with the provisions of the WTO Agreements’.38  
The Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO (which consists of Panels and 
Appellate bodies) has accepted the definition of sustainable development, recognised 
its importance and a broad global policy objective and has affirmed its commitment 
to sustainable development. In the 1998 US Shrimp case39 the panel noted that the 
concept of sustainable development ‘has been generally accepted as integrating 
economic and social development and environmental protection’.40 The 2001 US 
Shrimp case41 also recognised and accepted the Brundtland report’s definition of 
sustainable development and confirmed that sustainable development has a role to 
play in its interpretation of the GATT and assessment of whether states are in 
violation of WTO obligations.42  
But the WTO is a trade organisation, it is not an environmental organisation 
and does not aim to be one. As such it has only addressed environmental issues in so 
far as they stem from trade related measures with potentially discriminatory effects 
on trade.  One of the biggest controversies in the trade/environment debate has been 
then WTO’s treatment of Process and Production Methods (PPMs). Since the 
decisions of the Tuna-Dolphin cases43 under the General Agreement on Trade and 
                                                          
38 Doha Declaration WT/MIN (01)/DEC/2, at para 6 and The General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 
(1947) 55 UNTS 194; 61 Stat. pt. 5; TIAS 1700 Article XX.  
39 United States- Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp products WT/DS58/AB/R (1998).   
40 United States- Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp products WT/DS58/AB/R (1998) 
note 107. 
41 United States- Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products WT/DS58/AB/RW 
(2001).  
42 Ibid. 
43 United States- Restrictions on Imports of Tuna DS21/R-39S155 and United States-Restrictions on 
Imports of Tuna, Ds21/R, 30I.L.M. 1594.  
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Tariffs (GATT) system, the treatment of PPMs by the WTO has remained a concern 
for advocates of sustainable development.44 It has been argued that the WTO’s 
handling of the cases has been emblematic of the trade/environment debate in that 
trade liberalisation has been given a higher priority than the environment.45 This 
position is largely due to the fact that the cases drew a distinction between products 
and the processes used to create them, and did not allow states to differentiate 
products based on the processes used to create them. This approach is troubling for 
environmentalists, given that the production and disposal methods of products are 
important because environmental damage and pollution will usually occur during 
these processes, and will often not be caused by the product itself.46 
Environmentalists argue for Processes and Production Methods (PPMs) to be 
distinguishing factors since they allow the markets to take account of environmental 
externalities and to distinguish products that have been made using sustainable 
methods from those that have been made using unsustainable methods. This 
argument is based on the assertion that ‘by providing regressive measures towards 
environmentally harmful products the balance will shift in favour of eco-friendly 
methods’.47 Such a position is seen as being integral to sustainable development 
since it promotes an approach that focuses on sustainable ways to produce 
products.48 
 
1.5 Research question  
One of the principles emerging from all the soft law discussed above is that 
states have the responsibility of enacting environmental legislation and 
environmental standards that reflect precarious position of the global environment. In 
                                                          
44 Jason Potts, ‘The legality of PPMS under the GATT: Challenges and Opportunities for Sustainable 
Trade Policy’, International Institute for Sustainable Development (2008), Dominic A Gentile, 
‘International Trade and the Environment: What is the Role of the WTO?’, Fordham Environmental 
Law Review, Vol. 19 No 1 (2009) and Steve Charnovitz, ‘The Law of Environmental PPMs in the 
WTO: Debunking the Myth of Illegality’, The Yale Journal of International Law. Vol. 27 No. 59. 
(2002) 59-110.   
45 Ibid note 2.  
46 ‘Trade and Green Economy: A Handbook’, The United Nations Environment Programme Division 
of Technology, Industry and Economics, Economics and Trade Branch and The International Institute 
for Sustainable Development (2014) 3rd edition at 67. 
47 Ibid note 44 at 1.  
48 David Runnalls, ‘The WTO in the Trade and Environment Debate’ in “Trade, Environment and 
Sustainable Development: Views from sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America”. Ed Peider Konz, The 
United Nations University (2000) at pg. 61. 
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a setting where the ‘the major cause of the continued deterioration of the global 
environment is the unsustainable pattern of consumption and production’,49  states 
have the responsibility of setting standards that regulate the processes and methods 
used to produce goods so that the damage to the environment is minimised. 
This dissertation asks the following questions 
- Is the WTO’s policy on PPMs in line with the goal of sustainable 
development? 
- Does the WTO’s policy in relation to non-product-related Process and 
Production Methods undermine sustainable development and the ability 
of states to set their own environmental protection agenda? 
The dissertation will try to show that while GATT rules are not designed to 
undermine the objective of environmental protection, their application has reduced 
the ability of states to set their own agendas in relation to environmental protection. 
This will be done with reference to the ‘like product’ analysis under Article III:4 of 
the GATT which governs domestic regulations and the treatment they afford to 
domestic and imported products. It will be argued that the WTO’s policy in relation 
to non-product-related PPMs in the ‘like product’ analysis has the potential of 
undermining the efficacy of ecological protections put in place in pursuit of 
sustainable development.  
The dissertation will begin by providing an overview of sustainable 
development, Sustainable Consumption and Production Patterns and its role in 
achieving sustainable development as well the responsibilities it lays on governments. 
Chapter 3 will move on to introduce Process and Production Methods and the 
controversies surrounding their integration into international trade law. Chapter 4 
will look at what provisions of the GATT agreement are implicated in the PPM 
debate and how WTO case law has dealt with PPMs in the likeness determination 
and whether Article XX provides a suitable alternative to the Article III like product 
analysis. Chapter 5 will then look at whether the approach of the WTO is in line with 
sustainable development and the ability of states to set their own environmental 
protection agenda.  
                                                          




CHAPTER 2- SUSTAINABLE CONSUMPTION AND PRODUCTION 
PATTERNS 
2.1 Introduction  
As stated above, the premise of sustainable development is that the current 
patterns of economic growth, which are largely driven by production and 
consumption, are not sustainable. Following this line of thinking, one of the key 
goals of sustainable development is achieving sustainable patterns of consumption 
and production. During the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development the concept of sustainable consumption and production was identified 
as a key theme linking environmental and developmental challenges. This was 
reflected in one of the outcomes of the Conference, Agenda 21, which makes 
sustainable consumption and production a key part of achieving sustainable 
development.  
This chapter will provide an overview of the goal of sustainable consumption 
and production patterns and what it entails, especially by way of what responsibilities 
it places on states.   
 
2.2 Agenda 21 and sustainable patterns of production and consumption  
Agenda 21 is a plan of action to be implemented globally, nationally and 
locally where the environment has been impacted by human action. It provides that 
the one of the main causes of the sustained deterioration of the global commons is 
the unsustainable patterns of consumption and production and advocates for more 
focus to be placed on the ‘demand for natural resources generated by unsustainable 
consumption and to the efficient use of those resources consistent with the goal of 
minimizing depletion and reducing pollution’.50  
Chapter four of Agenda 21 is concerned with changing consumption and 
production patterns and identifies two broad objectives in doing so. The first is 
encouraging patterns of consumption and production that reduces environmental 
pressure and the second is better understanding the role of consumption in 
                                                          




sustainable development and finding feasible ways to move towards more 
sustainable production patterns.51 In identifying these two broad objectives it places 
the responsibility on governments to encourage ‘efficiency in production processes 
and decrease wasteful consumption that has become a part of economic growth’.52 In 
promoting this objective, Agenda 21 makes reference to the use of economic 
instruments such as environmental charges and taxes as a way of influence consumer 
and producer behaviour53 as well as the fact that ‘without market signals that make 
clear to producers and consumer the environmental costs of the consumption of 
energy, materials and natural resources and the generation of wastes’ changes in 
consumption and production patterns are unlikely to occur in the near future.54  
The goal of sustainable production and consumption patterns continued to 
feature in sustainable development discourse after the Rio Summit, which focused on 
the role international trade plays in promoting the concept of sustainable 
development. Ten years after the Rio Conference, the Johannesburg Plan of 
Implementation (JPOI) was signed at the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development.55 Chapter 3 of the JPOI was focused on ‘Changing Unsustainable 
Patterns of Consumption and Production’. It declared that ‘fundamental changes in 
the way societies produce and consume are indispensable for achieving global 
sustainable development’ and that countries should encourage the growth of more 
sustainable consumption and production patterns.56 It also called for the development 
of a 10-Year Framework of Programmes (10 YFP) to hasten the shift  
‘towards sustainable consumption and production to promote social and 
economic development within the capacity of ecosystems by…de-linking 
economic growth from environmental degradation through improving efficiency 
and sustainability in the use of resources and production processes and 
reducing resource degradation, pollution and waste’.57  
In turn, the Marrakech Process, a process that supports the development of a 
10 YFP on sustainable development, responded to this call by supporting the 
                                                          
51 Ibid at para 4.7. 
52 Ibid at 4.17.a.  
53 Ibid at para 1.25. 
54 Ibid at para 4.24. 
55 Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development and Plan of Implementation of the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development A/CONF.199/L.7.  
56 Ibid at para 14. 
57 Ibid at para 15. 
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implementation of sustainable consumption and production programmes, projects 
and policies, and contributing to the construction of a 10 YFP. The growth of 
sustainable consumption and production patterns as part of sustainable development 
is also seen in the Sustainable Development Goals. The Goals, which build on the 
Millennium Development Goals, were formulated at the UN Sustainable 
Development Conference in 2015, and state that one of their aims is to promote 
sustainable consumption and production patterns and to ‘increase net welfare gains 
from economic activities by reducing resource use, degradation and pollution’.58 
It seems as though the development of sustainable consumption and 
production patterns will continue to play a dominant role in the move towards 
sustainable development. But what does sustainable consumption and production 
entail? There have been a number of points of departure identified in what 
sustainable consumption and production patterns entail. These include ‘the level of 
emphasis on consumers, lifestyle and consumerism, differentiation between 
sustainable consumption and sustainable production and differing views about the 
need to change the aggregate level of consumption’.59 But it appears that there is 
consensus on the fact that it relates to the use of resources and energy (from resource 
extraction to the processing of those resources) to create goods and services for 
consumers.60 In line with this thinking, sustainable consumption and production has 
been defined as ‘the use of services and related products, which respond to basic 
needs and bring a better quality of life, while minimizing the use of natural 
resources …as well as the emissions of waste and pollutants over the life cycle of the 
service or product so as not to jeopardize the needs of further generations.’61 
The call for sustainable consumption and production patterns links economic 
processes to the environment and natural resources and looks to establish policy 
instrument and tools that encourage cleaner and more responsible production.62 The 
2015 United Nations Environment Programme Discussion Paper on ‘Sustainable 
Consumption and Production Indicators for the Future Sustainable Development 
                                                          
58 www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-consumption-production/ accessed February 1 
2017. 
59 Daniel A Farber, ‘Sustainable Consumption, Energy, and Individual Well-being’, Vanderbilt Law 
Review, Vol. 56 No 6 (2012) 1479- 1525 at 1488.   
60 Ibid at 1488.   
61 Oslo symposium 1994. 
62 ‘Sustainable Consumption and Production Indicators for the future SDGs’ UNEP Discussion Paper, 
March 2015 at 8. 
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Goals’,63 outlines how vital the concept of sustainable consumption and production 
patterns are to the achievement of sustainable development. In doing so it points to 
the United Nations General Assembly resolution 66/28864 which outlined the 
promotion of sustainable consumption and production patterns as the ‘overarching 
objectives of and essential requirements for sustainable development’.65 The paper 
states that this shows that achieving sustainable consumption and production patterns 
is a fundamental instrument in mitigating environmental degradation and resource 
depletion that is often a result from economic activity and growth.66 This is in line 
with the view that increased resource efficiency contributes to minimizing pressure 
on the environment. 
To this end, one of sustainable consumption and production patterns’ main 
goals is to separate economic growth and environmental degradation through the 
efficient use of resources in the production and use of products and by striving to 
maintain material and pollution intensity of all production functions within the 
carrying capacity of the environment.67 The implementation of the achievement of 
sustainable consumption and production patterns helps to balance the necessity of 
producing goods in order to maintain the population with that of using appropriate 
technologies and the efficient use of renewable and non-renewable resources. It tries 
to prevent environmental damage from the start of the life-cycle of goods- the 
production process.68  
 
2.3 Governments and sustainable consumption and production 
Consumers through their purchases and behaviour can demand more 
sustainable approaches from companies in terms of both their products and 
production methods. They can create markets for sustainable products and stimulate 
enterprises to innovate and develop new technologies to address environmental and 
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65 Ibid note 62 at 8. 
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67 John C Dernbach, ‘Sustainable Development as a Framework for National Governance’, Case 
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social challenges. But governments can directly invoke sustainable production 
through regulating and taxing companies.69  
It has been argued that the beginning of sustainable development is the need 
for markets to internalise environmental and social costs.70 This is the point at which 
the involvement of governments is important; this is because effective sustainability 
strategies will look to regulate market failures in terms of consumption (principally 
through taxes on and subsidies on consumers) and production (mainly through 
regulating producers and the processes they use).71 
In terms of consumption, governments can intercede in markets to address the 
failure of consumers to take into account for the environmental and social costs of 
their consumption. This is typically through taxes and subsidies which either increase 
or reduce the costs of consumer purchase and behaviours depending on their relative 
sustainability.72 Consumption taxes can discourage the use of polluting products and 
promote the production of recyclable alternatives.  When it comes to production 
and absorbing negative environmental externalities, a more direct and effective route 
to ensure sustainable production is to pass regulations, tax or subsidize producers and 
to make corporate responsibility mandatory instead of voluntary’.73 
 
2.4 Conclusion  
The free trade policy has the aim of letting markets decide where resources 
must be allocated to gain the most efficient use of them. On the other hand, 
environmental policy has the aim of managing and maintaining natural resources also 
in the most efficient way possible.74 This has resulted in emphasis being placed on 
the need for sustainable production. The international bodies discussed above 
recognise that unless and until production methods become sustainable, the ultimate 
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objective of sustainable development cannot be achieved. This conflict has to be 
reconciled in order to promote the agenda of sustainable development. One of the 
ways that has been proposed is the adoption of market based strategies like those 
listed above. This includes the regulation of process and production methods which 























CHAPTER 3- PROCESS AND PRODUCTION METHODS 
3.1 Introduction  
As mentioned above, absorbing negative environmental externalities, through 
the regulation of products and processes and taxes, has been identified as a way of 
achieving sustainable development.75  As stated in international instruments (for 
example the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21) the job of governments and legislators 
in these instances is to design and implement tools which assist the markets to 
internalise the negative environmental costs of economic activities. States often enact 
national environmental protection laws in order to regulate products on the basis of 
their production and process methods. This is because production and process 
methods are considered the principle sources of environmental damage- not the 
product itself. One method of doing this is through the regulation of Process and 
Production Methods (PPMs). However, difficulties arise in international trade law 
when countries attempt to apply domestic PPM regulations to foreign products. What 
follows is an introduction on Process and Production Methods.  
 
3.2 Process and Production Methods 
Process and Production Methods (PPMs) broadly refer to activities that are 
undertaken in the process of bringing a good to market.76 This includes activities 
related to the actual production of goods, or to the extraction of natural resources for 
eventual incorporation into goods, or to trading practices used to bring goods to 
market.77 This thesis focuses on the regulation of PPMs that cause environmental 
harms. More specifically, it focuses on laws or trade measures that aim to maintain 
the integrity of affected environments/ ecosystems by regulating the way in which 
products are processed and the way in which natural resources are harvested.  
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PPM regulations that are directed at environmental harm tend to address the potential 
production of negative externalities,78 they focus on the way in which products are 
manufactured and processed or the way in which natural resources are extracted or 
harvested as a way of protecting the environment.  
 
3.3 Product-Related PPMs v Non-Product Related PPMs  
A 1997 OECD report classified PPMs into two categories- product-related 
PPMs and non-product related PPMs.79 This classification is based on the point at 
which the environmental impacts of a certain PPM manifests; either during the 
consumption stage or the manufacturing stage. Product-related PPMs would be those 
whose environmental impacts manifest during the consumption stage of the product, 
while non-product related PPMs would be those whose impacts manifest during the 
manufacturing stage of the product. For the OECD, this was a way of telling the 
difference between a PPM requirement that deal with consumption externalities80 
and those that address production externalities.81   
Legal literature draws a distinction along similar lines.82 Product related 
PPMs are those that affect the characteristics of the product itself or influence the 
quality of the product. Regulations that relate to product related PPMs are used to 
guarantee the functionality of the product or to protect the consumer who uses the 
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product.83 These regulations help to ‘assure that customers receive a product at the 
anticipated quality level. Thus they are related to the product even though adherence 
to a particular process may not be directly detectable in the product’.84 On the other 
hand, non-product-related PPMs are those that do not have a discernible impact on 
the product. In this case, the use of a particular process or method does not have a 
bearing on the final quality of the product. Regulations that govern non-product 
related PPMs are generally ‘designed to achieve a social purpose that may or may 
not matter to a consumer’.85 In terms of environmental protection, non-product-
related PPM requirements generally aim to reduce or control negative or promote 
positive environmental effects during the production stage- before the product is 
placed on the market.86 As such they can include the prescription or restriction of 
certain technologies at the time of cultivation and/ or extraction of natural resources 
or the methods to be used when processing natural resources into goods that may be 
placed on the market.  
Read in line with the OECD report, product-related PPMs affect the quality 
or character of the product and its environmental effects occur during the 
consumption stage of the products life-cycle.87 On the other hand, non-product 
related PPMs don’t have any discernible impact on the products and its 
environmental effects occur during the manufacturing stage of the products life-cycle. 
Hence the focus on non-product related PPMs when it comes to regulating 
unsustainable production patterns.88  
PPM requirements can be designed in a number of ways, e.g. prescribing a 
PPM, prohibiting one or several PPMs or prescribing emission or performance 
effects rather than the method themselves. There are different instruments for 
implementing PPM requirements, such as regulations, labels and environmental 
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taxes.89 When referring to PPMs from this point, the dissertation will be talking 
about laws regulating non-product-related-PPMs. 
 
3.4. The Debate Around PPMs 
PPMs implemented only within national boundaries remain relatively 
uncontroversial. The same cannot be said of those that are implemented in the 
context of globalised or international markets. PPMs have been the subject of much 
debate and controversy, largely because they have a reputation for distorting trade 
and restricting market access, even though they have been deemed a vital tool in 
addressing environmental damage. The arguments for and against the regulation of 
PPMs in international trade will be briefly discussed below.  
The argument against allowing PPMs is largely concerned with its potential 
impacts on development. Those pushing for PPMs to be excluded from being a part 
of international trade law argue that placing environmentally based conditions on 
trade will create additional barriers to trade that will erode the development 
objectives of trade liberalisation.90 These parties perceive environmental conditions 
through PPM measures as systematic and veiled protectionism devised to protect 
domestic industries against foreign competition.91 Government might be driven by 
economic considerations rather than environmental considerations to ‘conduct an 
inventory of the environmentally preferable PPMs used by its domestic industries 
and make new regulations penalising those producers (that is, foreigners) not using 
them’.92 The central argument here is that protectionist elements of PPMs may 
impose burdens on foreign producers as a way of preventing them from gaining a 
competitive advantage and can be used to protect domestic producers and workers 
from import competition.93 This would limit imports produced in a specific manner, 
                                                          
89 Ibid note 86 at 7/ 
90 Ibid note 75 at 4. 
91 Ermias Ayalew, ‘Process- based Trade Related Environmental Measures under the GATT/WTO 
rules and effects in Least Developed Countries’, Jimma University Law Journal, Vol. 4, No 1. Jason 
Potts, ‘The legality of PPMS under the GATT: Challenges and Opportunities for Sustainable Trade 
Policy’, International Institute for Sustainable Development (2008) at 4 
92 ‘Trade and Green Economy: A Handbook’, The United Nations Environment Programme Division 
of Technology, Industry and Economics, Economics and Trade Branch and The International Institute 
for Sustainable Development (2014) 3rd edition at 67. 
93Ibid note 83 at 62. 
24 
 
for they would make it difficult and expensive for exporters since they would have to 
make sure that their PPMs conformed to the regulations of the importing state.   
It has been argued that the regulation of non-product related PPMs can be 
harmful to the economies of the exporting country, that they can create a negative 
economic effect in the exporting country. This is because regulations of PPMs have 
the potential to create financial and technological burdens, especially on small 
producers and developing countries since they would have to adapt their PPMs 
according to the requirements of importing countries.94 In the same vein it has been 
argued that allowing the use of PPMs might be detrimental to developing countries 
whose social priorities do not align with those of developed countries. The fear in 
this regard is that permitting trade measures or trade ‘barriers’ will allow developed, 
wealthier states to impose their ‘preferred norms on countries with lower incomes 
and different priorities’ in comparison to developed states. 95 For example, 
developing countries may be more concerned with building their domestic industries 
and infrastructures than with environmental issues; to insist that they adhere to strict 
environmental PPMs would be harmful to their development because a choice will 
have to be made between building their infrastructure or limiting potential economic 
growth by adopting environmental PPMs that force domestic producers to absorb any 
negative environmental costs from economic activities. 96 Linked to this is the idea 
that developed countries have built their wealth without having strict PPMs. Given 
this, it would be hypocritical to expect developing countries to forgo the step of 
unregulated growth.  
Another concern in the argument against the regulation of PPMs relates to 
sovereignty, especially in relation to environmental externalities limited to exporting 
countries. It has been argued that the decision as to the method of production must be 
left to the discretion of the exporting country where the adverse effects of PPMs is 
limited to that country alone. This is because it is an expression of state sovereignty 
under general international law, which includes the authority of a state to decide on 
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matters exclusively within its territory.97 There is worry that PPMs infringe on a 
state’s sovereignty as they are coercive in that they prescribe environmental policies 
to foreign governments.98  
On a more practical level, there is opposition to PPMs because they may lead 
to conflict if a number importing countries impose conflicting policy standards on an 
exporting country.99 There is the resultant fear that it will be next to impossible to 
manage different regulations and standards.100 
From the perspective of environmentalists, the use of PPMs has been seen as 
being crucial in addressing environmental damage in the context on international 
trade because the production and disposal methods of products are at the core of 
environmental damage- environmental degradation will occur during such processes 
and not from the product itself.101 Because of this, environmentalists claim that most 
environmental problems can be traced to environmentally destructive practices and 
that PPM requirements can help to ensure that the market takes into account 
environmental externalities by distinguishing between goods that are produced using 
clean and sustainable methods from goods that are produced using unsustainable 
methods.102  
Environmentalists also argue that in the absence of regulatory regimes that 
ensure imported products are subject to high environmental standards, the effort to 
apply high environmental standard to domestic products will be hindered.103 In a 
situation where only domestic products are subjected to higher standards they may 
not be able to equally compete with foreign producers that may offer their products 
with relatively cheaper prices.104 It is safe to assume that no country wants to make 
its producers less competitive by imposing higher environmental standards without 
ensuring that producers in exporting countries are subject to comparable standards. 
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Lobbyists of environmental protection argue that efforts to protect the environment 
cannot be realised without successfully regulating PPMs.105   
Disallowing the regulation of PPMs would also take away a significant 
potential weapon for environmental protection. If states fail to act to protect their 
own environment, without permitting PPMs other countries will have limited trade 
leverage to encourage better environmental practices, and it would be impractical 
and insufficient to wait for producing countries to take the necessary steps to protect 
the environment.106 
The call for allowing non-product-related PPM requirements is also based on 
the argument that they are effectively a result of dysfunction in international 
environmental governance. For a lot of environmentalist scholars, the lack of 
stewardship of the global commons and the ‘lack of liability for transboundary 
environmental harms’ are the reason that states at different stages of development 
turn to PPM requirements as a way of ensuring environmental protection.107 
Addressing the lack of responsible management of global resources would preclude 
the need for many PPM requirement’s and would simultaneously improve the 
prospects for economic growth and environmental protection.108 However, since this 
tool is not currently effective, it falls on states to protect the environment through the 
adoption of PPMs.   
 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to explain what PPMs, the controversy surrounding them and 
why states seek to use them as a way of addressing environmental harms.  
There has been criticism that some countries are choosing unilateral national action 
over available multilateral action but the fact is that effective, broad-membership 
treaties are difficult to achieve.109 And when the best option of multilateral 
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cooperation is unavailable or ineffective, governments may consider using PPM 
requirements in order to combat environmental harms indirectly.  
It has also been shown that there are valid concerns on both the side of 
environmentalists and the side of proponents of trade liberalisation. The important 
question at this point is whether and how these conflicting concerns have been 
balanced. This dissertation will now discuss the provisions of GATT that are 
implicated in the use of PPMs to differentiate between products. It will also provide a 





















CHAPTER 4- GATT OBLIGATIONS, EXCEPTIONS AND CASE LAW 
4.1 Introduction 
The principal mandate of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) is to facilitate 
the move towards a more open, non-discriminatory and equitable international 
trading system.110 The preamble of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, 
which sets out the obligations of WTO members, states that in pursuing this 
multilateral trading system, states will ‘enter into reciprocal and mutually 
advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other 
barrier to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international 
commerce…’.111 To this end, the fundamental cornerstone of the WTO system is the 
principle of non-discrimination. This cornerstone is composed of the Most-Favoured 
Nation Principle and the National Treatment Principle, as laid out in Articles I and III 
of the GATT respectively.112 These are also the provisions of the GATT that inform 
the PPM debate, the central concept under both being ‘like product’. This is because 
in an effort to address environmental damages, PPM requirements may differentiate 
between products that are physically identical but differ in the processes used to 
bring them to market.113 Measures such as these would be in violation of Article III 
only if sustainably and unsustainably products are considered ‘like products’ 
This chapter provides an overview of the relationship between the key 
substantive obligations and their exceptions in GATT, as well as a summary of 
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4.2 The GATT Provisions Which May arise in the Context of PPMs 
The Most-Favoured-Nation principle is enshrined in Article I of GATT. It 
prohibits discrimination between ‘like products’ based on the country of origin. 
Article I provides that,  
‘with respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or 
in connection with importation or exportation…and with respect to all rules and 
formalities in connection with importation and exportation…any advantage, 
favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product 
originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately 
and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the 
territories of all other contracting parties’.  
An advantage under Article I is any measure that makes it easier for an exporter to 
enter the market of an importer. In the EC-Banana III case, the panel found that 
advantages are those that create favourable import opportunities or affect the 
competitive relationship between products of different origin. 114  The MFN is 
essentially concerned with ‘promoting equality of competitive opportunities’ among 
exporters.115  
The National Treatment Principle is enshrined in Article III of the GATT and 
it prohibits discrimination between like products between imports and domestic 
measures. Article III provides that products of a member states, imported into the 
territory of another member state shall not be subjected to taxes or charges in excess 
of those applied to ‘like domestic products’, and that imports of a member states 
imported into the territory of another member state ‘shall be accorded treatment no 
less favourable that that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all 
laws, regulation and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, 
purchase, transportation, distribution or use’.   
Article III is concerned with different treatment between domestic and 
imported products and with providing equality of competitive conditions and 
opportunities in relation to domestic and imported products.116 The purpose of the 
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national treatment rule is to ensure that products from abroad have the same 
opportunity to compete in domestic markets, and that domestic taxes, laws, 
regulations and policies do not negatively impact the competitive opportunities of 
imported products. Article III creates an obligation on its members to treat imported 
products no less favourably than like domestic products. This means that members 
may treat imported products less favourably than domestic products if the two are not 
like.  
It is important to note that the application of both the articles is qualified by 
the requirement that the non-discrimination principle only applies where ‘like 
products’ are involved.117 PPM requirements bring up the issue of likeness because 
in an effort to address environmental damages, domestic environmental measures 
may draw a difference between products which on the face of it may seem to be 
identical, but differ in the environmental effects of the processes/ methods used to 
manufacture them. Measures such as these would be in violation of Article III only if 
sustainable and unsustainable products are considered ‘like products’. 
The concept of ‘like product’ has been subject to a great deal of debate which 
centres around the question of how likeness may be determined, this will be 
discussed below.  
 
4.3 Likeness 
Determining whether two products are ‘like’ is crucial in deciding whether a 
member has violated the obligation of non-discrimination. The GATT does not 
provide a definition of the meaning of what ‘like products’ are. The criteria for 
determining what constitutes a ‘like product’ have developed as a result of the 
development of GATT/ WTO case law but were first laid out in the Border Tax 
Adjustment Report.118 In this report, the working panel noted that previous 
discussions in the GATT had not been successful in providing a solid interpretation 
of the term ‘like products’. It concluded that determining whether products are ‘like’ 
should be done on a case by case basis, holding that ‘this would allow for a fair 
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assessment in each case of the different element that constitute a “similar 
product”’.119  
The working party did suggest criteria that could be used for determining 
likeness, these were: the products end uses in its given market; consumer tastes and 
habits’ and the physical properties, nature and quality of the product.120 In Japan 
Alcoholic Beverages, the fourth criteria of tariff classification was added into the 
“likeness determination. 121 These four criteria are to be applied to the products in 
issue in order to determine whether the two products are like, allowing for the panel 
to proceed to an assessment of non-discrimination requirements.  
The point of discussion when it comes to likeness and PPMs is that it seems 
to be accepted that the dispute settlement body of the WTO has held that the term 
‘like product’ only relates to the inherent nature of the product itself.122 The result is 
that products may not be distinguished on the ground of the process or methods used 
to make the product if their physical characteristics are the same.123 Thus in the 
determination of whether two products are like or not the focus should only be 
placed on the criteria listed above and not on additional factors extraneous to the 
physical characteristics of the product. Any negative externalities that are the result 
of a production process or method are not to be considered.124   This would mean that 
non-product-related PPMs would be excluded from being a determining factor in 
deciding whether products are like or not. 
The question of ‘like’ products is key to the interaction between international 
trade law and national environmental measures. Environmental measures may draw a 
difference between products that are- on the face of it- similar, but that in some 
aspect, for example production process, have different environmental. In this case, if 
the concept of ‘likeness’ is interpreted so that it considers environmentally harmful 
products as being ‘unlike’ to products that have been produced in an environmentally 
sustainable manner, then the WTO obligation of non-discrimination would provide 
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increased flexibility to member states enacting environmental measures.125 On the 
other hand, if environmental considerations are not taken into account when 
determining whether two products are ‘like’, then the WTO’s non-discrimination 
provisions could constrain attempts by member states to enact environmental or 
health protection measures.126 
This thesis now moves on to consider WTO cases and jurisprudence relating 
to ‘like products’ and the extent to which the requirement to accord non-
discriminatory treatment to like products prohibits differentiation based on 
environmental standards observed during the production or processing of the product 
in question.  
 
4.4 WTO Dispute Settlement Body 
One of the results of the Uruguay round of negotiations was the establishment 
of a new rules based (rather than mediation based) dispute settlement system. This 
was enshrined by the Dispute Settlement Understanding. In this system, the adoption 
of a report by a panel may only be blocked if there is consensus from the Dispute 
Settlement Body to do so, in addition to this an Appellate Body was established in 
order to review panel findings.127 
Following the Tuna/Dolphins panel reports,128 (as decided under the GATT 
1947) most  discussions on the international trade and environment debate begin with 
the assumption that non-product-related PPM have been banned by the WTO.129 The 
assumption that the WTO dispute settlement system excludes the ways a product has 
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been produced from consideration in whether products are like.130 The purpose of the 
discussion that follows is to establish whether this is so.  
 
4.4.1 GATT AND WTO CASE LAW 
UNITED STATES- RESTRICTIONS OF IMPORTS OF TUNA, 1991131  
The Tuna/Dolphin case has been seen as being characteristic of the trade 
regulation/environment debate. This is because it was the first case to consider the 
validity of import restrictions imposed on environmentally damaging PPMs in the 
WTO context. The case dealt with a ban enforced under the Marine Mammal 
Protection Act of 1972 which prohibited tuna and tuna products from being imported 
into the United States if the tuna had been harvested using purse-siene nets in the 
Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean. 132  The United States justified the ban by claiming it 
was necessary to protect dolphins that were inadvertently caught by the nets when 
catching tuna. When accused of violating GATT it defended the measure by arguing 
that it amounted to internal regulations under Article III and was applied equally to 
domestic fishermen and vessels as well, meaning that it was permitted under Article 
III as an internal measure, and that Article XI did not apply.133  
In addressing the defence of the United States, the panel noted that 
contracting parties were allowed to impose internal regulations on products imported 
from other contracting parties provided that these regulations were not applied so as 
to afford protection to domestic production and that they accorded imported products 
treatment that was no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national 
origin as set out by Article III.4.134 However, the panel found that the measure did 
not fall under Article III because the Article ‘covers only those measures that are 
                                                          
130 D.J.F. Eaton J. Bourgeois, ‘Product differentiation under the WTO: An analysis of labelling and 
tariff or tax measures concerning farm animal welfare’, June 2005 Report, Agricultural Economics 
Research Institute, The Hague.  
131 United States- restrictions of Imports of Tuna DS21/R-39S155.  
132 Marine Mammal Protection Act Pub. L. No. 92-522, 86 Stat. 1027 (1972).  
133 Article XI of the GATT prohibits states from using quantitative restrictions (e.g. quotas or bans on 
imported products). It disallows ‘prohibition or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges’ 
on products from member countries. Based on the above, Article XI does not deal with restrictions 
placed on products after entry into the importing country. This is dealt with under Article III as they 
amount to internal measures. However, the scope of these Article may overlap.  
134 Ibid note 131 at para 5.9. 
34 
 
applied to the product as such’.135 The panel reached this conclusion by referring to 
the repetitive use of the word ‘product’ in Article III and the call in Article III for a 
comparison between imported products and domestic products. The Panel drew a 
distinction between the actual product, and the process used to harvest the product.136 
It held that because the regulation only governed the taking of tuna (the process) it 
could not affect tuna as a product and thus could not fall under Article III.  
This was criticised by environmentalists because in this case the process used 
to attain the product was as important as the product itself.137 The measure had the 
aim of protection dolphins but by effectively drawing a distinction between 
regulations affecting the product and regulations affecting processes relating to the 
product, the panel took away the country’s ability to ban products on the basis that 
they were produced using environmentally unsustainable practices, in doing so it 
removed regulations affecting processes and production methods outside the purview 
of Article III:4.  
While the Tuna-Dolphin case was not adopted by the parties to the GATT, it 
has shaped the attitudes of people towards the GATT, painting it as an enemy of the 
environment. 
 
US- MEASURES AFFECTING ALCOHOLIC AND MALT BEVERAGES, 1992138 
In this case Canada complained that various tax measures relating to the 
production, wholesale, distribution and retail of beer and wine in the United States 
violated Article III. The measures were varied and used various criteria to distinguish 
between products and producers (of the alcohol) and as such the panel had to deal 
with a number of scenarios in which they had to determine if the products at hand 
were ‘like products’.  
In a ‘like product’ analysis looking at whether regulations could provide more 
favourable treatment to a domestic beverages than an imported beverages, the Panel 
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looked at past decisions and noted that decisions on this question have been made on 
a case-by-case basis which involved examining all relevant criteria, such as the 
product's end-uses in a given market, consumers tastes and habits, and the product's 
properties, nature and quality.139 The panel was also of the view that when 
interpreting the phrase ‘like product’, the purpose of the whole of Article III must be 
taken into account. It held that the purpose of Article III is to ensure ‘that internal 
taxes and other internal charges, and laws, regulations and requirements affecting the 
internal sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of products...should not be 
applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic 
production’.140 That is, it is to prevent governments from protecting domestic 
production.  
Based on this it was its opinion that governments can enact laws 
differentiating between ‘like products’ if the distinction between the two products 
was a result of a valid public policy reason and not ‘to afford protection to domestic 
production’.141 Since no policy reason was advanced to justify the differentiation of 
the products and that state and federal tax laws did not make such a distinction, the 
panel held that the products were like and the distinction was designed to afford 
protection to domestic production. As such, Article III was violated.  
The Malt Beverages case is notable since it introduced the idea of looking at 
the ‘aim and effect’ of the measure in question, in order to justify the differentiation 
between seemingly like products. This test is of relevance to this thesis because it 
provides an alternative way to differentiate between products that are alike in every 
way except the way in which they are processed. It is also an attractive option for 
environmentalists since it allows the Dispute Settlement Body to contextualise the 
regulation as part of the ‘like product’ analyses and in doing so exclude the 
possibility of protectionism in favour of addressing environmental concerns. All they 
would need to show is that there is a valid public policy reason for the measure and it 
is not to afford protection to domestic production.  
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UNITED STATES-RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF TUNA142 
This case emerged from the same set of facts as the first Tuna/ Dolphin case 
and was decided similarly. In this case the European Economic Community (EEC) 
took issue with the intermediary nation embargo under the MMPA. The Intermediary 
nation embargo in S101 (a) (2) (c) of the Marine Mammal Protection Act provided 
that the Secretary of Commerce ‘shall require the Government of any intermediary 
nation from which yellowfin tuna or tuna products will be exported to the US to 
certify and provide reasonable proof that it has acted to prohibit the importation of 
such tuna and tuna products from any nation from which direct export to the US of 
such tuna and tuna products is banned’. The EEC argued that the import prohibition 
amounted to a quantitative restriction and was thus contrary to Article XI of the 
GATT.143 They also argued that the embargo could not be seen as the enforcement at 
the time or point of importation of an internal law, regulation or requirements which 
applied to like imported and domestic products within the meaning of Article III.144   
The panel in this case also held that Article III did not apply to laws ‘related 
to policies or practices that could not affect the product as such’.145 Like its 
predecessor, the Panel noted Article III’s constant reference to products and the need 
to have a comparison between the treatment accorded to domestic products and the 
treatment accorded to like imported products. The Panel held that Article III did not 
apply since the United States trade embargo distinguished between tuna products 
according to the harvesting practices used. The Panel repeatedly underscored the fact 
that differences in harvesting techniques do not affect products as products, and that 
therefore any measures targeting against certain production and processing methods 
lies outside the scope of Article III.146  
It was once against implicit that there is a distinction between products as 
such and the process used in producing the products.  
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Like its predecessor this Panel decision was also not adopted. However, it 
differs in that the Panel noted that ‘the objective of sustainable development, which 
includes the protection and preservation of the environment, has been widely 
recognised by the contracting parties to the General Agreement’.147 The Panel 
observed that  
‘the issue in this dispute was not the validity of the environmental 
objective of the United State to protect and conserve dolphins. The issue was 
whether, in the pursuit of its environmental objectives, the United States could 
impose trade embargoes to secure changes in the polices which other 
contracting parties pursued within their own jurisdiction’.148  
This seemed to indicate that the panel recognised that the trading system 
could promote free trade while recognising that states can and must protect the 
environment as part of sustainable development. 
 
UNITED STATES- TAXES ON AUTOMOBILES, 1994149 
In this case, the EU lodged a complaint that the US Corporate Average Fuel 
Economy regulation violated Article III.4 because it involved an averaging method 
that treated domestic and foreign automobiles separately. The EU argued likeness of 
products should be based on the traditional criteria laid out in the Border Tax 
Adjustment.150 The United States on the other hand argued that the main criterion in 
determining likeness would be to ask whether the measure in question was applied 
‘so as to afford protection to domestic production’.151 
The panel in this case adopted the approach of the panel in the Malt 
Beverages case and decided that the determination of likeness under Article III.2 had 
to include an investigation of the aim and effect of the measure in issue.152 Meaning 
that products may be differentiated on public policy grounds. It expanded the test by 
stating that when questioning whether the regulations effects afforded protection to 
domestic production, the proper inquiry would be look at whether the effect were 
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changes in the ‘conditions of competition’, and not just if they changed the volume 
or flow of imports.153  
The case seems to accept that product may be considered not ‘like’ if they are 
produced differently, even if their product characteristics are the same. In the context 
of PPMs, the panel’s ruling can be taken to mean that a country’s process based trade 
measures may not be necessarily inconsistent with Article III, even if it results in 
different treatment of domestic and identical imported products. The reason for this 
construction lies in the fact that two products may be considered as not like based on 
the difference in their PPMs, provided that the measure is not taken so as to afford 
protection to domestic products.  
 
UNITED STATES- STANDARDS FOR REFORMULATED AND 
CONVENTIONAL GASOLINE, 1996154 
The action in this case was initiated in response to regulations enacted by the 
United States according to the Clean Air Act of 1994.155  The measure required a 
reduction in emissions of gasoline from a pollution baseline. It was argued that the 
measure was discriminatory because it assigned foreign producers a standard 
baseline from which they had to reduce their gasoline emissions, while giving 
domestic refiners an individual baseline.  
In determining whether imported and domestic gasoline were like products, 
the panel took note of the Border Tax Adjustment criteria as well as of the Japan-
Alcoholic Beverages case. The panel noted that the imported and domestic gasoline 
had the exact same physical characteristics, end-uses, tariff classification and were 
substitutable and so concluded that they were like products under Article III.4.156  
More importantly the panel pointed out that the determination of likeness under 
Article III.4 should be done ‘on the objective basis of likeness as products…not 
based on extraneous factors’ such as the characteristics of the producers or 
manufacturers157. The panel expanded the likeness analysis by holding that Article 
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III.4 does not allow less favourable treatment dependent on the characteristics of the 
producer.158 This was because ‘the treatment of the imported and domestic goods 
concerned should be assured on the objective basis of their likeness as products and 
should not be exposed to highly subjective and variable treatment according to 
extraneous factors’.159  
If applied in the context of PPMs, this decision would mean that difference in 
the method of production may not be considered as factors to determine whether two 
products are ‘like’ since production methods may be deemed as ‘extraneous’. The 
panel ruling limited the possibility that the determination of likeness may go beyond 
physical characteristics of products, except when considering the already established 
criteria of consumer preference and tariff classifications.160  
 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES- MEASURES AFFECTING ASBESTOS AND 
PRODUCTS CONTAINING ASBESTOS161 
This case was not a PPM decision since the ban in question was based on the 
dangers of the product, but it included an examination of the term ‘like products’ in 
the context of Article III:4. But if the decision of the panel had been upheld it could 
have had negative implication for PPMs.  
In this case Canada argued that a French ban on asbestos and asbestos 
containing products was a violation of Article III:4. The panel once again had to 
determine whether the domestic and imported products under the ban were ‘like 
products’. The panel used the criteria set out in the Border Tax Adjustment report 
and held that the risk to human health/ life posed by the product could not be a factor 
in determining whether the products in issue were like. The European Communities 
appealed the decision of the panel, arguing that the panel had erred in failing to 
consider the health risks of the product in its ‘like products’ analysis.  
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In discussing Article III:4, the Appellate Body referred to the analogy of the 
Japan- Alcoholic Beverages panel about ‘likeness’ being an accordion that stretches 
in different ways depending on the provision at issue, indicating that there needs to 
be some flexibility when determining whether products are like.162 It went on to note 
that ‘like product’ determinations should be guided by the principle laid out in 
Article III:1 which aims to prevent members from enforcing regulation so as to 
afford protection to domestic production.163 This seems to leave open the door for the 
possibility that process-based trade measures could be consistent with Article III:4 
since they would have to be assessed in a purposive manner with the objectives of 
Article III- the prevention of protective discrimination against imports- in mind.164  
One of the key points of the case was that the Appellate Body made it clear 
that panels must look at all evidence relevant to a likeness determination. This was 
because it held that the Panel had made a mistake in its ‘like products’ analysis by 
failing to examine and consider all the evidence under all of the Border Tax 
Adjustment criteria. The Appellate Body stated that panels must look at each 
criterion separately and then weigh them against all the relevant evidence before 
concluding whether products are like or not.165 ‘Therefore, even if the evidence 
related to one of the Border Tax criteria is extremely persuasive a panel may not end 
its ‘like products’ analysis after examining only that one specific factor. Rather it 
must also proceed to look at all of the evidence related to the other three criteria’.166 
In addition to this, it stated that the Border Tax criteria were not the only factors a 
panel could examine and that panels should look at any other relevant evidence to 
assessing the likeness of products.  
The Appellate Body in this case did not close off the possibility that products 
may be differentiated based on the regulation of the processes used to make them. 
First of all, the Appellate Body refers to the need for ‘likeness’ to be like an 
accordion that stretches depending on the provision at issue.167 This seems to indicate 
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that the likeness of products may depend on the context. This could provide a way in 
which the question of likeness may be set in the context of environmental damage 
and efforts to limit it. Secondly it adopts a stance similar to that in the Malt Beverage 
and Taxes on Automobiles cases by stating that the likeness determination should be 
guided by the objective of Article III which is to prevent members from enforcing 
regulation that afford protection to domestic production. If the focus is on this, it 
leaves space open for an ‘aims and effect’ type test that would provide for a more 
purposive approach to be taken in the ‘like product’ analysis. This seems to leave 
open the door for the possibility that process-based trade measures could be 
consistent with Article III:4 since they would have to be asses in a purposive manner 
in light of the objectives of Article III- preventing protective discrimination against 
imports.168 The case also provided that the Border Tax criteria are not the only 
criteria a panel can consider, and that other evidence should be considered, this 
leaves open an opportunity for DSB to consider a more contextual approach- looking 
at the aim of the measure in question etc. This leaves the potential for production 
processes to be brought in as factors to consider when determining likeness.  
 
4.4.2 GATT EXCEPTIONS 
When discussing the interpretation of the concept of ‘like products’ and its 
implication on whether products may be differentiated on the basis of process and 
production methods, it is necessary to deal with Article XX of the GATT, which is 
concerned with general exceptions to the obligations of WTO member states. The 
provision is a way in which the WTO/GATT tries to balance its objective of trade 
liberalisation with actions of states that relate to issues of public policy.  Article XX 
provides ten types of measures under which member states may deviate from their 
general obligations. Article XX (b) and (g) have been interpreted as the parts of 
Article XX that encompass environmental measures. The exceptions laid out in 
Article XX are subject to its chapeau which requires that measures must not be given 
effect to in ways which would ‘constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised 
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restriction on international trade’. Article XX (b) relates to measures ‘necessary to 
protect human, animal or plant life or health’ while subsection (g) is concerned with 
measures ‘relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such 
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production 
or consumption’.  
Article XX essentially provides that there may be instances in which 
discrimination is justifiable under the GATT. If this is so, why is the debate around 
trade measures centred on PPMs continuing, why can’t the regulation of non-product 
related PPMs simply be justified under Article XX? Would it not be more 
appropriate to deal with PPM-based trade measures under Article XX rather than 
Article III? Article XX does offer some defence for pro-environmental national 
policies but many environmentalists regard its scope, as laid out in panel decisions, 
to be disproportionately narrow, ‘preserving only very limited and circumscribed 
national sovereignty with respect to environmental initiatives’.169  
When invoking Article XX (b), the party enforcing the environmental based 
trade measure must satisfy the ‘necessity test’. The measure adopted must be 
‘necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health’. In the Thailand-
Cigarettes case, the panel established that the measure adopted has to be the ‘least 
trade restrictive’ measure available.170 That the measure in question would be 
exempted only if there were no alternative measures that were consistent with the 
GATT or one that was less consistent with the GATT. This line of thinking was also 
adopted by the first Tuna-Dolphin case, which stated that the primary step in 
satisfying/ invoking Article XX was that the party must have ‘exhausted all option 
reasonably available to it’.171 This approach has been criticised for being overly strict 
in legal and policy aspects.172 It has been argued that the necessity test could 
constitute an ‘excessive infringement on the economic sovereignty of a member 
country that wants to make decisions through the democratic process’.173 
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The necessity requirement has evolved in subsequent cases.174 There has been 
a move away from focussing on having the ‘least trade restrictive’ measure possible 
to focusing on a proportionality test that weighs the interests in issue. The appellate 
in EC-Asbestos referred to its findings in the Korea-Beef case that when establishing 
whether a measure is necessary, it needs to balance a  
‘series of factors which prominently include the contribution made by 
the measure to the enforcement of the law or regulation at issue, the importance 
of the common interests, or values protected by that law or regulation, and the 
accompanying impact of the law or regulation on imports or exports’.175  
In the EC-Asbestos case, the Appellate Body noted that ‘the more vital or important 
the common interests or values’ that are pursued, the easier it would be to accept as 
‘necessary’ measures designed to achieve those ends.176  
When invoking Article XX (g) the key phrases involved are ‘relating to’ and 
‘in conjunction’. Panels and Appellate Bodies have held that ‘relating to’ means that 
the measure must be primarily aimed at rendering effective the restriction it holds.177 
In relation to this, the Appellate Body in the Shrimp Turtle case, stated that there 
must be an observable real and close relationship between the means (the measure 
adopted) and the end (legitimate policies on environmental protection).178 In terms of 
defining what ‘in conjunction’ meant, the requirement established by the Appellate 
Body was one of even-handedness when imposing restrictions on foreign and 
domestic products.    
If the measures in question satisfy the requirements under Article XX (b) or (g) 
they must still pass muster under the chapeau. The chapeau of Article XX states that 
measures may be excepted if they are not applied in a manner that constitutes ‘a 
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail’ and should not amount to a disguised restriction on trade. In the 
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Shrimp-Turtle case the Appellate Body established that applying the chapeau of 
Article XX is  
‘one of locating and marking out a line of equilibrium between the right 
of a Member to invoke an exception under Article XX and the rights of 
other Members under varying substantive provisions of the GATT 1994 
so that neither of the competing rights will cancel out the other and 
thereby distort and nullify or impair the balance of rights and obligations 
constructed by the Members themselves in that Agreement. The location 
of the line of the equilibrium, as expressed in the chapeau, is not fixed 
and unchanging: the line moves as the kind and the shape of measures at 
stake vary and as the facts making up specific cases differ’.179  
So what does this mean for PPMs in GATT law? Article XX serves the 
purpose of providing a public policy ground on which WTO members may deviate 
from the obligations set out in GATT, and if PPMs fit within the exceptions set out in 
Article XX (b) and (g) and satisfy the requirements of the chapeau they are 
determined to be GATT compliant. Case law has also seen the application of Article 
XX become less strict in its interpretation of Article XX (b) and (g). It has moved 
away from looking to establish that the measure in question is the most GATT 
consistent (which prioritises trade interest over other considerations) to looking at 
balancing all relevant factors in the case (in this case legitimate environmental 
policies (PPMs) and concerns of trade protectionism) in order to establish even-
handedness between the measure in question, what it aims to achieve and the trade 
restrictions it creates. 
 But this does not mean that the Article allows member states to implement 
PPM-based trade measures with more freedom. This is because its seems to have 
concurrently established rigorous standards for a measure to qualify under the 
chapeau. The chapeau requires that  there is a close enough connection, or a 
‘sufficient nexus’ with the environmental problem being targeted by the measure, 
that the measure is not disproportionately broad in its reach, that the ‘means and ends 
relationship’ between the measure and its is ‘close and real, in order for the Appellate 
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Body to be prepared to accept that process-based trade measures.180 ALL OF these 
requirements threaten any ‘acceptable overall balance between trade and political 
difficulties of passing effective environmental legislation’, especially since it seems 
that it is too oriented around trade with limited engagement with environmental 
concerns.181  
In addition to this, the acceptance of PPM measures as GATT compliant 
‘depends on the precise modalities if implementing a scheme; the law does not offer 
adequate predictability and legal security’.182 Since the requirements discussed 
above may be difficult to meet in practice, they may not translate into a willingness 
on the part of states to implement measures that can be easily struck down. States 
will only implement trade measures if they are certain that they will stand up to the 
scrutiny of the Dispute Settlement Body and requirements it has set out, in fear of 
any impacted countries successfully challenge it.183 But because there is not a lot of 
certainty around the requirements set out in Art XX, they may not implement any 
environmental protection policies, for fear of being in a WTO dispute. All of this 
means that the product/process distinction, and the fact that it limits the role of non-
product related PPMs in differentiating between products, still poses a serious 
obstacle when it comes to the implementation of process based trade measures, even 
if non-product related PPMs are permissible.184 
 
4.8. Conclusion- Status of PPMs  
At the beginning of this chapter it was stated that there is an assumption was 
that the WTO does not allows for member states to differentiate between products on 
the basis of the processes used to create them. However, trade measures regulating 
non-product-related PPMs (PPMs that look at processes behind the product) have not 
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been prohibited by WTO jurisprudence. H however, Article III has been interpreted 
in a way that is unfavourable towards the use of non-product-related PPMs in that the 
way in which ‘like products’ has been interpreted ‘substantially limits the regulatory 
space available to construct consistent PPM-based regulations’185 that is, 
differentiating products on the basis of how they were made has been made more 
difficult. 
The case law has indicated that there is some flexibility when determining 
whether imported and domestic products are like, however there seems to have been 
a strict adherence to the traditional criteria laid out in the Border Tax Adjustment 
report. In addition to this, the cases have also repeatedly said that likeness must be 
determined with reference to objective factors and not extraneous ones. This 
indicates that the panels may be reluctant look beyond the physical characteristics of 
products at issue, that they may not be willing to consider the aim/ intent of PPM 
measures.  
The established interpretation of the concept of ‘like product’ in WTO 
jurisprudence does not readily allow product differentiation on the basis of differing 
PPMs. Regulations around PPMs essentially depend on the qualifications contained 
in Article XX and as mentioned above, a lot depends on the precise methods of 
implementing the regulation; WTO law does not provide enough predictability, 
stability or clearly defined and definite rules which are valued by law makers/ 
regulators.186 All of this means that the product/process distinction still poses an 
obstacle when it comes to the implementation of process based trade measures. 
The question remains as to whether this approach is in line with the principle 
of sustainable development. This thesis will move on to provide an overview of 
sustainable development and provide a view as to whether it can be reconciled with 
the approach of the WTO 
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CHAPTER 5- IS THERE A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE WTO POLICY VERSUS 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND THE ABILITY OF STATES TO SET 
THEIR OWN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY? 
5.1 Introduction  
National sovereignty provides states with the authority to perform activities 
other entities simply cannot. This includes defence of territorial integrity, the creation 
and implementation of domestic laws as well as the provision of public goods like 
social services and a clean environment. Because of this authority, Agenda 21 
recommends that national governments ‘ensure socially responsible economic 
development while protecting the resource base and the environment for the benefit 
of future generations’.187 This awareness is at the core of sustainable development 
and highlights the essential role that governments have to play in nurturing 
sustainable development. It pushes for governments to ‘enact effective 
environmental legislation’, including trade related environmental standards as part of 
international environmental goals.188 
Because governments are responsible for moving legal and organizational 
structures towards sustainable development, they need to be able to formulate and 
implement laws and policies that guide private and governmental decisions towards 
sustainable development, and to regularly modify them when appropriate in order to 
improve their efficacy.189 Agenda 21 recognises the importance of these regulations 
and emphasises that markets and governmental economic policies have to play an 
expanded role in the move towards sustainable development.190  
As established above, non-product-related PPM requirements have not been 
prohibited by the WTO when it comes to determining likeness. However, Article III 
and XX have been interpreted in a way that is unfavourable towards the use of non-
product-related PPMs, as a way of differentiating between products, in that the way 
in which the idea of ‘like products’ has been interpreted “substantially limits the 
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regulatory space available to construct consistent PPM-based regulations191 This 
conclusion is based on the fact that production and manufacturer characteristic 
standards have been consistently held not to apply in Article III cases. Meaning that 
PPM regulations that are formulated along these lines would be excluded in the ‘like 
product’ analysis of Article III. Furthermore, there also seems to be a great 
reluctance on the part of the Dispute Settlement System to take into account bona 
fide PPM measures in order to balance them against existing trade interests as a way 
of justifying them. In addition to this, Article XX does not offer the predictability 
and legal certainty that would appeals to policy makers.  
Does this approach by the WTO undermine sustainable development and the 
ability of states to make their own environmental policy? 
 
5.2 Contradictions with sustainable development and the prerogative of states to set 
environmental policy 
Earlier in the dissertation, it was shown that an integral part of sustainable 
development is the principle of integration. That new norms and standards (in this 
case sustainable development) have to be taken into consideration and given their 
proper weight.192 It is argued that the WTO Dispute Settlement Body has not given a 
high enough priority to the integration of the concept of sustainable development into 
its policies. It has not been able to find the balance needed between sustainable 
development and its objective of trade liberalisation, given that the case law 
discussed above seem to have resolved Article III unfavourably towards PPM 
regulations by continuing to accept the product and process distinction. This 
dissertation recognises that there is a need to be watchful of protectionism and 
discrimination in international trade, but rather than limiting the applicability of PPM 
based trade measures, the WTO needs to make integrated decisions by balancing the 
interests at hand. Environmental protection is needed but this mustn’t be at the 
expense of the goal of trade liberalisation. So, when looking at environmental 
measures, they must be accepted only if they are not protectionist and purely 
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discriminatory. This examination has to be an important part of the trade/ 
environment/PPM debate.  
The aim of Article 3 is to limit protectionism. What this dissertation proposes 
is that when dealing with trade measures concerned with environmental protection, 
‘like products’ need to be defined within the context of the trade provision in 
question. PPM based trade measures should not be struck down just because there 
are incidental discriminatory effects on imports. The National Treatment Principle 
works on the basis that differing treatment of imported and domestic products is 
susceptible to protectionist treatment, but this premise is not always true: there are 
justifiable policy reasons for treating like products differently that are not 
protectionist. Adopting an approach like this would not compromise the mandate of 
the WTO since it would allow the panels to keep in the front of its mind that this 
measure must not be applied so as to afford protection to domestic measures. An 
approach like this would allow the WTO to balance the need to stamp out 
protectionist measures while balancing them against environmental interests. 
Whether the measure in question distinguished between imported and domestic 
products for valid public policy reasons or for protectionist reasons would be 
relevant to the question of whether the affected products were ‘like products’. 
Applying Article III should not be a matter of distinguishing products characteristics 
from the processes and production methods used to make it; it should be about 
looking at the policy behind the differentiation. You would have to look at whether 
the regulation in question is primarily aimed at environmental conservation and 
whether there is a sense of even-handedness or proportionality in the way the 
regulation is imposed. Once again this would be about finding a balance/ looking to 
reconcile the competing interests of the parties. 
This thesis argues for the adoption of the approach provided by the Appellate 
Body in Japan- Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages193 where the Appellate Body stated 
that,  
‘no one approach to exercising judgement will be appropriate for all 
cases…The concept of “likeness” is a relative one that evokes the images of an 
accordion. The accordion of “likeness” stretched and squeezes in different 
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places as different provisions of the WTO Agreement are applied. The width of 
the accordion in any one of those places must be determined by the particular 
terms ‘like’ is encountered as well as by the context and the circumstances that 
prevail in any given case to which that provision may apply’.194 
This approach is similar to that of Howse and Regan who argue that the ‘sensible 
consideration of aim and effects is essential to identifying protectionism and limiting 
protectionism’.195 In the wake of the case law setting out the WTO’s approach to 
dealing with PPMs, alternative ways of interpreting Article III have been offered up- 
ways that readily allow PPMs to be part of the ‘like product’ analysis.196 Howse and 
Regan197 argue that the text of the GATT does not support an interpretation of the 
product/process distinction and advocate for the revival of the ‘aims and effects’ test 
which looks at the ‘regulatory intent of the legislator’- that panels should consider 
the aim and effect of a regulation in order to determine whether differential treatment 
of products is GATT compliant.198 The Malt Beverages and the Taxes on 
Automobiles cases introduced into the like product analysis the ‘aims and effects test’, 
the approach looked to determine whether the measure in issue has a bona fide 
regulatory approach and whether it has the effect of altering conditions of 
competition in order to protect its producers.199 In both cases the panels found that 
parties could ‘distinguish in their fiscal or regulatory measures between domestic and 
imported products for legitimate policy purposes as long as this distinction did not 
result in protection (intended or afforded)’.200 This approach would allow for 
regulatory objectives to be invoked in the Article III analysis.201  
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However, the Japan- Alcohol case rejected this approach in favour of an 
objective analysis of whether the measure was applied so as to afford protection.202 
This seems to defeat the goal of sustainable development as it dismisses the potential 
for a more contextualised approach to the like product analysis. By examining the 
regulatory purpose of the measure in question, it would allow panels/ appellate 
bodies to ‘respond with more flexibility to common concern policies and provide 
openness for PPMs’.203  It would bring the WTO closer to its policy goal of 
sustainable development while still promoting trade liberalisation. It is a balancing 
act that has the potential to be successful and would not use the mechanical product 
process distinction. This call for flexibility was restated in the EC Asbestos case 
which called for all criteria to be considered separately and weighing all relevant 
evidence. This could provide some space for development of WTO case law, 
especially if the Dispute Settlement System adopts the aims and effects test. 
It would also allow for states to take the lead when it comes to implementing 
strategies for sustainable consumption and production patterns. The ability to make 
trade measures based on process and production methods is a vital potential weapon 
for environmental protection. ‘Most commentators recognise that process-based trade 
measures also are capable of expressing well-grounded and sincerely held concerns 
of consumers, such that restricting their use would prevent not only disguised 
protectionism, but also a host of legitimate democratic aims’.204 If a nation fails to 
act to protect the environment, other countries may have limited trade leverage to 
encourage better environmental practices…simply waiting for the producing country 
to ‘clean up its act’ is likely to be insufficient.205 
A similar approach to that offered up by the ‘aims and effects’ tests is the call 
for an approach that takes ‘into account the design, architecture and structure of the 
measure. This provides some leeway with regard to PPMs. As long as the measures 
aim is not blatant protectionism in favour of domestic products, the regulatory 
approach could be used as part of the likeness analysis thus enabling PPMs to be part 
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of the element to be considered based on the objectives they embody’.206 An 
approach such as this would exclude the mechanical product/ process distinction and 
still provide a way of identifying and limiting protectionism since it would require an 
analysis of the design of the measure in question. It would also provide some flexibly 
by allowing the environmental policy subject to while still looking out for any 
intended protectionist behaviour and promoting the goal of sustainable 
developments.  
It is also important to recognise that others have argued that more focus needs 
to be placed on the way that measures and state policies are formulated in order to 
avoid being GATT incompatible.207 This approach puts the onus of state to craft their 
regulations and laws in a way that fits with WTO jurisprudence. ‘Consistency with 
Art. I and/or Art. III will largely turn on the selection of appropriate product 
definitions in PPM policy design and implementation. Since Art. I and Art. III 
obligations apply only across “like products,” differential treatment based on PPMs 
becomes a non-issue so long as a set of specified PPMs are sufficient to qualify 
products as “unlike” their non-PPM counterparts’.208 
 
5.3 Conclusion  
The policy adopted by the WTO seems to be in direct contradiction with the aim of 
sustainable development that states take on the responsibility of designing and 
implementing environmental protection policies that take into account the damage 
done by production processes and methods. This is largely because they are limited 
in how they can design PPMs.  ‘Although WTO law does not directly dictate what 
the goals of a government’s environmental policy should be or what instruments can 
be used, the scope of WTO law is broad enough to influence those choices…WTO 
law removes policy space from governments to use environmental measures in 
particular ways.’209 They no longer have the space in which to design policy 
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instruments that help the market to internalise to internalise market activity in ways 
that support sustainable development.210 This thinking is in line with arguments that 
‘implicit understandings of the GATT illegality of PPM policy, has led to a general 
reluctance to consider such initiatives among the range of viable policy options for 
meeting any given policy objectives’.211  
Because of this and the uncertainty around what policies will pass muster under both 
Articles III and XX, states will not risk the chance of being part of a trade dispute 
and may shy away from making environmental laws/ policies with implications in 
international trade law. The constant threat of a WTO challenge will inhibit 
initiatives to enforce PPM regulations. We need a definitive statement/ definition on 
what like products are because as it stands, its wording does not prohibit the 
inclusion of production processes as a way of determining likeness. Governments 
will be unlikely to set optimal environmental policies if they are part of the WTO 
because the use of trade instruments will be constrained by the findings of the 
DSB.212 
This will mean that states cannot effectively communicate the environmental costs of 
certain economic activities. This means that any negative externalities and inefficient 
processes involved in the production of goods are not reflected in the cost of the 
product, meaning that states lose out on the opportunity to change economic actors’ 
behaviour in this regard.213 
In order for the WTO to bring its policies in line with sustainable development it is 
necessary for it find a balance between trade and the protection of the environment. It 
needs to add more urgency in its legal findings when it is dealing with environmental 
measures. This is not an argument for the complete overhaul of the WTO system, but 
an argument that pushes for the WTO Dispute Settlement System to embrace the 
balancing act that is emblematic of sustainable development.  
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CHAPTER 6- CONCLUSION 
This dissertation has shown that the premise of sustainable development is 
that economic growth, which is largely driven by consumption, is not sustainable and 
that as such one of the key goals of sustainable development is achieving sustainable 
consumption and production patterns. It has pointed to a number of international 
meetings and instruments that advocate for more focus to be placed on the ‘demand 
for natural resources generated by unsustainable consumption and to the efficient use 
of those resources consistent with the goal of minimizing resource depletion and 
reducing pollution’.214 In identifying the objective of encouraging patterns of 
consumption and production that will reduce environmental pressure and meet the 
needs of humanity, responsibility is placed on government to encourage efficiency in 
production processes and decrease wasteful consumption. A way of doing this that 
has emerged has been through the regulation and taxation of private companies as a 
way of making the internalise negative environmental externalities that result from 
their economic activities. More specifically, governments will adopt sustainability 
strategies that look to regulate market failures in terms of production by regulating 
products and the processes they use. Trade related measures are a useful tool in the 
move towards sustainable development because of their ability to influence 
economic activity on an international scale and in doing so ‘encourage substantive 
changes across multiple jurisdictions.215As such, PPM policy represents an important 
opportunity for implementing the chapter 4 of Agenda 21 and the integration of 
sustainable development within the international trade framework more generally.   
The Dispute Settlement Body has accepted that the WTO Agreement, which 
clearly adopts sustainable development as an objective of the organisation, has to be 
interpreted in line with it preamble.216 In the Shrimp-Turtle case, the Appellate Body 
recognised and referred to instruments in International Environmental Law in 
discussing unilateral actions on the part of states. So why would the WTO policy be 
seen as contrary to the goal of sustainable development and states’ freedom to adopt 
environmental protection measured? 
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One of the cornerstones of the WTO is the principle of non-discrimination. 
However, its application is qualified by the requirement that non-discrimination only 
applies where ‘like products’ are involved. It is the concept of ‘like products’ that has 
caused difficulty in the trade-environment debate when it comes to regulations that 
control non-product related PPMs. This is because the Dispute Settlement Body has 
drawn a distinction between products and process used to make those products when 
determining whether products are ‘like’.   
While it was originally assumed that differentiating products on the basis of 
the processes used to make them had been prohibited by the WTO, the dissertation 
has made it clear that that is not the case. However, the analysis of WTO case law 
has shown that Article III has been interpreted in a way that is unfavourable towards 
the use of non-product-related PPMs in that the way in which ‘like products’ has 
been interpreted as limiting the space in which consistent PPM-based regulations 
may be constructed, that is, differentiating products on the basis of how they were 
made has been made harder. 217This conclusion is based on the fact that production 
and manufacturer characteristic standards have been consistently held to be outside 
the scope of Article III. 
The case law has indicated that there is some flexibility when determining 
whether imported and domestic products are like, however panels and Appellate 
bodies have paid particular focus to ‘objective factors’ when making a likeness 
determination; this indicates that the panels may be reluctant look beyond the 
physical characteristics of products at issue, that they may not be willing to consider 
the ‘intent’ behind PPM measures. The regulations around PPMs essentially depend 
on the qualifications contained in Article XX and as mentioned above, a lot depends 
on the precise methods of implementing the regulation; and WTO law does not 
provide enough predictability for regulators.218 All of this means that the 
product/process distinction still poses an obstacle when it comes to the 
implementation of process based trade measures.  
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This dissertation argues that WTO law as it exists to address trade measures 
regulating non-product related PPMs, seems to be in direct contradiction with the 
aim of sustainable development which requires that states take on the responsibility 
of designing and implementing environmental protection policies that take into 
account the damage done by production processes and methods. This is largely 
because they are limited in how they can design PPMs.  ‘Although WTO law does 
not directly dictate what the goals of a government’s environmental policy should be 
or what instruments can be used, the scope of WTO law is broad enough to influence 
those choices…WTO law removes policy space from governments to use 
environmental measures in particular ways.’219 They no longer have the space in 
which to design policy instruments that help the market to internalise market activity 
in ways that support sustainable development.220  
Because of this, this dissertation argues that decisions made by the Dispute 
Settlement Body must be made in light of contemporary concerns and these include 
the goals of sustainable development and the preservation of the environment. The 
WTO has recognised sustainable development (in the preamble to the WTO 
Agreement, The Doha Declaration and some of the cases discussed above) as a broad 
global objective as well as a part of the mandate of the international economic 
systems- but its approach needs to respond to the dynamic nature of environmental 
concerns. It needs to embrace the integrative approach espoused by sustainable 
development and seen in international tribunals. Doing so would enable it to make 
more well-rounded decisions that can weigh environmental interests and those of 
pursuing the liberalisation of international trade. It would enable it to look at the aim 
and purpose of PPM based trade and analyse whether they are bona fide or are 
simply protectionist. It must make sustainable consumption and production patterns a 
part of the way it interprets what like products are by making process and production 
methods a way of distinguishing between products so as to help further the goal of 
sustainable development.  
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